Taken at face value, green growth appears impervious to critique. Economic growth is taken as good, imperative, essentially limitless, and a matter of pressing concern for society as a whole. And green growth owes much of its influence given that it charts a pathway for continued economic growth even in the face of the environmental crisis and criticisms thereof. Further, the project of economic growth is not easily dislodged. It flows from fundamental societal transformations associated with the advent of modernity (the linearization of time, the notion of progress, the dissolution of just wage norms, and the quantification of processes of wealth, production and distribution). Institutionally, the growth imperative is an inherent attribute of the capitalist mode of production exacerbated under the neoclassical economics paradigm. This capitalism "distinguishes itself from all other socio-economic systems in human history by the movement towards the infinite"; its totalising logic penetrates society in all its facets and converts "almost the entire world into a field of valorisation" (Mahnkopf, 2016) through "the process of competitive, blind accumulation that grants to capitalism its distinctive requirement for relentless growth" (Meadway, 2016) .
In an early effort to characterize and justify the economic growth paradigm, Adam Smith speculated that it is "in the progressive state," when society "is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest" (Smith, 1776, p. 81) . It is in a state of continual economic growth that emancipatory potential is achieved, and not just wealth. And, indeed, the subsequent two centuries of industrial capitalism did significantly advance the "acquisition of riches," as well as raise life expectancy, erode feudal and patrimonial forms of personal economic dependence, and catalyse advances in individual liberty and democracy that, although geographically very uneven in quality and application, were global in scale and momentous in scope.
This narrative of the "progressive state" of capitalist modernity is now struggling to retain its coherence in three respects. One is internal to the growth paradigm itself. The system's own yardstick of success, GDP per capita growth (annual %), has for several decades followed a flat and even downward trajectory in many coun- Bank, 2017) . Although global capitalism is systemically "compelled towards growth," it appears to be "decreasingly able to deliver it" (Meadway, 2016) . The second is a scepticism vis-à-vis the "Smithian promise" that growth will emancipate the poor. Against a backdrop of vulgar levels of income inequality, the supposed connection between economic growth and social wellbeing has been increasingly called into question by prominent studies (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009 ). Some critics argue that "just when the human species discovers that the environment cannot absorb further increases in emissions, we also learn that further economic growth in the developed world no longer improves health, happiness or wellbeing" (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2009; p.215) .
The third is a growth scepticism fuelled by concerns over the diminishing ecological space available to supply non-renewable resources and to absorb the effluents of ongoing growth. Ecological thresholds are being breached, and "tipping points" appear to be upon us (Rockstrom et al., 2009) . To this, the dominant response has long been one or another variant of "green growth":
the idea that investment in the production of knowledge and science, the resulting innovations in technique, environmental awareness that purportedly comes with rising incomes, and a structural shift toward less resource-and energy-intensive service sector industries will "save the planet" (Tierney, 2009) . In its formalized version, this idea came to be known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The EKC holds that, after a certain point, economic growth correlates strongly with greater efficiency in resource use. However, the idea that a simple, inverse relationship exists between per capita income and environmental stress has been challenged on a number of counts. For example, the idea that caring about the environment is a privilege of rich people is baseless; it ignores the "environmentalism of the poor"
(Down to Earth, 1993 , Martinez-Alier et al., 2016 and Kothari, 2016 . Moreover, the EKC hypothesis has held in particular conditions, with respect for example to pollutants that have short-term costs, such as particulates,
and not with respect to accumulating wastes or to pollutants involving long-term costs, such as greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). The EKC hypothesis ignores the fact that reduced pollution in developed countries is often part of the same processes-above all, the outsourcing of manufacturing, and consequently pollution, to developing countries-that determine the expansion of resource-intensive production elsewhere (Sunderlin, 2003, p. 161) .
A major hope of green growth advocates, on which much of their case rests, is that efficiency gains will negate overall increments in attendant energy and material throughput, including a dramatic reduction of GHG emissions. But this is much too sanguine, not least because it neglects to consider the "Jevons Paradox", which postulates that the improved technological efficiency in the utilization of a natural resource, within a capitalist framework, tends not to decrease but to increase its overall rate of consumption, because its relative cost is lessened and thereby increasing demand and freeing up capital for alternative uses (Jeavons, 1865) .
This is a key reason why the ability of efficiency strategies to successfully address the crisis in society-nature relations is likely to remain limited.
GREEN GROWTH IN PRACTICE
On the one hand, energy efficiency measures have way, a sustainable society will, ultimately, require the transcendence of, or breaking away from, the systemic, objective logic that dictates capital's ceaseless motions to produce and reproduce itself in ever widening spaces of commodified nature and society." Connected through these shared experiences of alienation and exploitation "labour struggles are environmental struggles, and vice versa" (Lohmann, 2016) .
However, the convergence of different movements
around transformative goals is never automatic. All social movements are criss-crossed with contestation and dialogical relations, internal debates and tensions. and their own notions of well-being" (Kothari, 2016) .
In an effort to distil the principles that inform these efforts, labelled Radical Ecological Democracy (RED) (Kothari, 2016) will also have to recognize the fine line between policy-based expansion of democratic spaces that aid fundamental transformation, and those that the state uses to soften or even co-opt peoples' movements" (Kothari, 2016) .
In another example of alternative, the community-based energy utility pioneered in the state of Delaware, USA, represents an effort to move the energy sector away from the conventional approach of atomized households served by a distant centralized utility with energy mined from an externalized, commodified nature (Taminiau & Byrne, 2016) . Teasing out the operative mechanism that grants the conventional energy-society relationship its daunting momentum, civil society has become reduced to a "consumer democracy" in which the ability of end-users of energy "to influence entrepreneurial and capitalistic activity is limited to their daily vote on the means of production through the global marketplace." As a Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU), the Delaware initiative envisions steering the energy sector away from "consumer democracy" to a role where consumers are also producers and, further, are envisioned as "sustainable citizens" engaged in energy conservation, energy efficiency and renewable energy commons. The providers" responding to market demands more than as the collective producers of "new socio-economic subjectivities" (Böhm et al., 2016) .
In sum, alternatives may not happen without larger we "…need to realize that the required transformation goes far beyond innovation and structural changes to include democratization of the economy, better distribution of income and wealth, power over markets, and a culture of sufficiency."
CONCLUSION
The language of green growth is alluring for a political economy mired in lingering economic lethargy, persistent poverty, rising inequality and stubborn environmental crises that persist and expand despite four decades of modern environmentalism. Collectively, these crises have undermined confidence in economic orthodoxy's assertion that growth is good, even necessary. Greening growth, thus, is a promise to heal that distrust -growth is good because it can be "green."
In practice, however, this proposal has not withstood scrutiny. It holds an excessively narrow, even contrived, The democratic version is necessary, but insufficient to redress our present crises. Acknowledging this evidence, many civil society actors across the world are instead in pursuit of alternatives to economic orthodoxy.
They have advanced alternatives that organize labour and control over consumption and production in ways that attempt re-embedding the economic system within society. These movements to counter the orthodoxy's arrangement of situating the economy in an autonomous and controlling position over society are foundational.
They appear to proceed through resistance, innovation but also through accommodation. The path ahead is yet unclear but the goal is less so. Despite current ambiguity they are fertile and urgent grounds for innovation, experimentation and social change.
